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BOOK REVIEWS

An Introductory Guide to EEC Competition Law and Practice, (3d ed.).
By Valentine Korah. Oxford, England: ESC Publishing Limited, 1986.
Pgs. 177.
A well-known expert in United Kingdom and European Economic
Community ("EEC") competition law, Dr. Valentine Korah is offering
us the third edition of her EEC competition law handbook. Originally
written to help business executives comply with the EEC competition
rules,1 the third edition has been expanded by sections on price theory,
mainly designed for lawyers. Written in clear and simple language, the
book gives an excellent overview of the EEC competition law system,
placing it within its historical and institutional framework and laying the
required emphasis on its connection with the EEC Treaty's objectives of
stimulating efficiency and promoting market integration.2
The author discusses a number of practical questions which are of
immediate relevance to both business executives and lawyers. For example, Korah analyzes the pros and cons of notification to the Commission
of the European Communities ("Commission"),3 the advantages to be
gained from amending an agreement before notification,4 and whether to
comply voluntarily with a Commission request for information. She
gives useful advice concerning the manner in which Commission investigations are conducted and the steps to be taken by companies to protect
their rights.6
The book is devoted primarily to an analysis of Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty, Regulation 17,7 and the main group exemption regula1 V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (1978).
2 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49.
3 V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 35-37,
55-57 (3d ed. 1986)[hereinafter V. KORAH, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE, 1986].
4 Id. at 57.

5 Id. at 39-41.
6 Id. at 41-46.
7 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
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tions adopted under Article 85(3). Consideration is also given to the
existence of civil law sanctions of breaches of the competition rules. Finally, the Commission's practice and the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities ("Court") relating to the main categories
of horizontal and vertical agreements and to the interplay between industrial property rights and the EEC Treaty rules are also described. 9
Although the book's 177 pages allow only for a brief discussion of
most problems, a number of fundamental points are examined in a stimulating and original manner. Thus, the notion of "barriers to entry" and
its relevance to the assessment of a dominant position are discussed on
several occasions.' ° The author adopts a narrrow definition of this concept, limiting its application to the obstacles that create a greater hindrance to newcomers than to incumbents. One wonders, however,
whether it is possible to exclude from the definition obstacles such as the
need to invest a large amount of capital or to wait several years before a
new plant comes on line. While it is true that such barriers had to be
overcome by incumbents and must still be overcome by new entrants, the
fact remains that such barriers tend to make new entry more difficult,
even if they do so only in relative terms, and, thus, consolidate the position of incumbents. The author's reliance on "classical economists"'" to
support her interpretation is, unfortunately, not sufficiently specific to
permit verification.
Other issues on which Korah provides interesting commentary indlude the distinction between vertical and horizontal restrictions, the
concept of oligopolistic interdependence, and the assessment of potential
competition. On this latter point, she rightly criticizes some of the early
joint venture decisions of the Commission. 2 Later, however, she applauds the Commission's recent tendency, heralded in its Thirteenth
Competition Policy Report, 3 to base its decisions on a more realistic
market analysis before deciding that joint venturers are potential
competitors.
On the whole, Korah takes a refreshingly critical view of the Commission's practice and of the Court's case law. She analyzes both on the
basis of an efficiency test and stresses, quite correctly, the danger in con8 V. KORAH, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE, 1986, supra note 3, at 48-58.
9 Id. at 59-71.
10 Id. at 4-7, 120-22, 126-29.
11 Id. at 126.
12 Id. at 111-12.
13 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY (1983).
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fusing issues of unfair competition law or of protecting small businesses
with the objectives of competition policy.
Finally, a list of bibliographical references taken from EEC, United
Kingdom, and United States sources, a useful glossary of technical
terms, and the texts of relevant EEC Treaty articles and regulations,
complete this most useful and stimulating introductory guide.
Michel Waelbroeck*

* Partner, Liedekerke, Wolters, Waelbroeek & Kirkpatrick, Brussels, Belgium.

Patent Licensing and EEC Competition Rules: Regulation 2349/84. By
Valentine Korah. Oxford, England: ESC Publishing Limited, 1985. Pgs.
126. R & D and the EEC Competition Rules: Regulation 418/85. By
Valentine Korah. Oxford, England: ESC Publishing Limited, 1986. Pgs.
114.
These two books will be welcomed by academicians and practitioners alike. In these two relatively short texts, Dr. Valentine Korah has
undertaken a remarkably detailed and thorough analysis of the provisions of the two most important groups of exemption regulations adopted
by the Commission of the European Communities ("Commission") since
1984.1 Each provision of the regulations is analyzed in extensive detail.
The author takes into consideration the drafting history of each regulation, its purposes, and the general objectives of the European Economic
Community. One is surprised to discover how many questions of interpretation are raised by the text of these regulations. The answers which
Korah provides take into consideration the literal meaning of the provisions as well as their spirit and purpose in conformity with the case law
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities ("Court").
A particularly good example of Korah's comprehensive approach is
seen in her interpretation of the "putting on the market" concept. Making such a determination provides the starting point of the five-year period during which a patentee may protect a licensee against "passive
sales" by other licensees in the same territory. Taking into consideration
the provision's purpose-to allow licensees limited protection so that
they may tool up and develop a market for the licensed products-Korah
concludes that the five-year period should start running only when the
investment starts to pay off.' Consequently, according to the author, a
mere test marketing exercise would not qualify as "putting on the
market." 3
The reader will also appreciate the thorough discussion of the interconnection between the various group exemption regulations. To what
extent can the provisions of one regulation be combined with those of
another in order to apply to agreements which fall partly within the
scope of both group exemptions? This difficult question is only partially
answered by the regulations' provisions and their preambles. The considerations which Korah devotes to this discussion fully deserve reading.
In addition to an analysis of the technical provisions of the regulations, the author discusses questions of more general interest. Thus, she
1 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984) as corrected in 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113)
34 (1985); 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 5 (1985).
2 V. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING AND EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 2349/84 40-

44 (1985)[hereinafter V. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING].
3 Id. at 42.
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stresses the need to introduce a rule of reason into the application of EEC
competition law.4 Such a rule, Korah contends, avoids burdening the
Commission with the notification of a host of insignificant agreements,
the legal validity of which will be put at risk for an extended period of
time. Without such a rule of reason, the competition law potentially
could hamper the development of projects which would have an overall
procompetitive impact. Thus, the Commission's tendency to consider
any restriction on the freedom of the parties to an agreement as a restriction of competition may, as Korah points out, discourage the development and dissemination of technology and its accessibility to a larger
number of firms.5 This result may ultimately hinder rather than promote
competition.
A few of the author's positions, while clearly and forcefully expressed, are not entirely convincing. For example, Korah's argument
that tying agreements in patent licenses should be prohibited only if they
allow the licensor to reap monopoly profits6 ignores two significant
points. First, the risks to competition of tying arrangements arise not
only from the possibility of obtaining excessive profits, but from foreclosing competitors of the tying party from the possibility of selling to the
tied customers. Second, even if the tying agreement does not result in an
immediate increase in the tying party's profit, the agreements may have
anticompetitive effects on the general structure of market competition,
thereby enabling the tying party to increase its market share to the detriment of competition.
Another assumption made by the author which may be questioned
is that most licensing agreements are entered into between parties in a
vertical relationship; consequently, any restriction between them should
be judged according to the more lenient standard applicable to such
agreements.7 Korah's definition of a vertical relationship is limited to
situations in which the licensee is incapable of competing with the patentee without a license.' This definition seems to be overly restrictive.
Even if the licensee is in such a position, the licensee may be, and generally is, a potential competitor of the patentee. As a result of the license
grant, the licensee becomes an actual competitor of the patentee. The
relationship is, therefore, horizontal, not vertical. Only in rather exceptional circumstances-where, for example, distribution of a product in4 Id. at 3-7; V. KORAH, R & D AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 418/85 2-8
(1986)[hereinafter V. KORAH, R & D].
5 V. KORAH, R & D, supra note 4, at 2-8.
6 V. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 2, at 79-80.

7 Id. at 31-32.
8

Id.
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volves the use of a patented process by a distributor not otherwise
capable of competing with the patentee-may one speak of a truly vertical relationship between the patentee and the licensee.
Also of particular interest is the consideration given to the "opposition procedure." 9 Unfortunately, Korah does not take a clear position
with regard to the Commission's authority to institute an opposition procedure in group exemption regulations. Nonetheless, her analysis of the
system set up by the regulations and of the procedural problems which
they raise, especially in connection with the possibility of appeals to the
Court, is well worth reading.10
It should be mentioned that an annotated version of the regulations
discussed is appended to each volume. Thanks to numerous footnotes,
cross-references, subtitles, and underscoring of selected words and
phrases in each clause, Korah has succeeded in making the regulations
much more handy and convenient instruments to use.
Michel Waelbroeck*

9 Id. at 88-103; V. KORAH, R & D, supra note 4, at 66-82.
10 V. KoRAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 2, at 99-103; V. KoRAH, R & D, supra note 4, at
78-81.
* Partner, Liedekerke, Wolters, Waelbroeck & Kirkpatrick, Brussels, Belgium.

